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Abstract
I document empirical regularities of flooding in the US with newly-compiled in-
sured, uninsured, historical loss, and flood zone data at the town level for the decade
after 2003. I identify instances with low damage and low risk expectations, implied
by the high uninsured share, where experience with or proximity to flooding can raise
perceived risk. I examine the causal impact of flood damage on population change
and its interaction with the real estate market. I find that risk revisions are important
determinant of population change and real estate values. Only growing places with low
historic flood loss or those with low-risk flood planes experience population declines.
The decline is related to investments in flood risk mitigation which raise cost of living.
Elsewhere, higher risk only depreciates house values, causing higher-income households
to leave. Floods also have significant spillovers on population and prices in neighbors
with no direct damage.
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1 Introduction
Flooding in the US is an important and growing concern, with over 10% of US housing
located in a floodplain and population in hazardous areas within the floodplain (1 in 50
year) projected to double by 2050.1 Even if residents avoid risky areas with historical flood
losses and flood zones, changes in the severity of weather or new construction can cause
out-of-pocket losses in unexpected locations.2 Experience with or proximity to such losses
can raise risk expectations and cause residents to buy flood insurance, pay for flooding
mitigation, or relocate. Identifying how much people engage in each of the three as risk
expectations increase is key to understanding how newly impacted communities change over
time. Isolating the role of risk revisions is challenging, particularly in the case of extreme-loss
events, as housing reductions, job losses, and existing flood insurance also play a role.3
This paper studies the causal impact of flooding on population change and its interaction
with the real estate market. I focus on communities which experience relatively low flood
loss and which have lower insurance coverage as a result of their limited historical experience
with flooding. The limited loss minimizes the importance of changes in the supply of houses
or employment, among other important factors, while the lower insurance coverage suggests
that flooding is unexpected, at least for a portion of the residents. Both imply that the
revision of risk in affected communities plays a key role. Gallagher (2014) and Lindell and
Hwang (2008) argue that experience with and proximity to flooding lead to risk revisions.4 In
this paper, I posit that the pre-existing level of risk expectations is also important and that
revisions in communities with low level of expectations are more likely to affect population
and house prices. I identify pre-existing expectations with a new measure of historic loss5,
which relies on new data of housing units completely destroyed by floods since 1978, and
1Wing et al. (2018) estiamtes that 15.4 million houses are situated in a 1 in 100 year floodplain.
2As of 2011 only 32.5% of the maps “adequately identified the level of flood risk”, OIG (2017).
3See Landry et al. (2007), Bleemer and van Der Klaauw (2017), and Vigdor (2008) which focus on Katrina.
4Gallagher (2014) shows that flood insurance purchases increase after flooding. Lindell and Hwang (2008)
highlights previous experience as key to in increases risk perception, while Peacock et al. (2005) report that
proximity is important. Shaw and Baker (2010) show that the effect of past experience varies over time.
5Main results are similar when I identify lower expected risk with flood insurance coverage instead.
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with the size of low-risk flood zones (1 in 500 year).
I use a new dataset of insured and uninsured, town-level flood damage for the decade
after 2003, which allows me to distinguish communities with flood losses and those where
losses were not expected.6 I define floods as instances where more than 0.01% of the local
real estate value is lost.7 This definition reveals three important regularities relevant for the
empirical design. I find that locations that lose at least 0.01% of real estate value to flooding
more than once during the sample period, experience more destructive events.8 Focusing on
places that flood once limits the overall distribution of flood loss for the areas of interest:
90th/95th percentiles are 0.46%/1.03% for the single-flood versus 0.86%/1.72% for triple-
flood locations. I show that places that flood once during the sample period and have low
historical loss (below the state median) also have lower flood insurance coverage – and likely
lower flood expectations – relative to those with higher historical loss. This allows me to
compare the differences in population and real estate values for areas with lower overall loss
but with varying flood-risk expectations, attributing them to the revisions of expectations.
Furthermore, by separating communities based on their pre-existing population growth, I
can identify whether productivity or amenity factors that attract new residents interact with
the baseline effect of expectations on population and real estate values.
I estimate an event-study model identified by shifts in the population average and trend,
focusing on places with a single flood during the sample. I test for population changes dur-
ing/after the flood as well as breaks in the existing population trends. The model controls
for fixed effects and pre-flood trends since the communities in the sample are quite differ-
ent and grow at different rates. I also control for population responses to floods that can
6Information comes from FEMA and SBA and includes historical payouts and structures destroyed since
1978, for events at 4,147 census-designated places.
7The cutoff is the median value when absolute damage is over $10,000. This cutoff is arguably arbitrary.
Lower values will designate as floods instances where a limited fraction of households are affected, while
higher values focus on relatively bigger events. To make sure that I capture cases where poor/vulnerable
neighborhoods are affected, I further report results when floods are defined above 0.0076% – the median
value for instances with more than $1,000 in absolute damage.
8This finding is also confirmed by Kousky and Michel-Kerjan (2017) with property-level insurance claims
data. Note that I include communities with two consecutive floods in the single-flood category.
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be explained by local characteristics such as the fraction of renters and non-construction
jobs, among others, since these also affect how population changes after flooding. Whether
communities are affected at all is an open question. They can just increase flood insurance
demand, as shown by Gallagher (2014), or invest in flood mitigation, as in McCoy and Zhao
(2018). Furthermore, lower, uninsured damages can be absorbed and floods be ignored as
rare events, particularly if expected future severity is low.
I have four main findings. First, single-flood places with low historic loss or extensive
low-risk flood zones have lower flood insurance coverage (flood insurance payouts per capita)
relative to single-flood, high-historic loss places for the same level of damage. This establishes
that low-historic-loss communities likely have lower flood-risk expectations and underinsure
against flooding. Second, I find that floods cause a sizable population decline primarily in
the low-historic-loss areas. This suggests that uninsured losses and flood proximity – as
opposed to the magnitude of damage, which I control for – change expectations of future
losses sufficiently and affect the location choice of residents. Third, after separating places
with flood-driven population responses by pre-flood population growth, I find that the decline
is limited to growing locations. It appears that newcomers steer away from locations with
increased flood risk. Fourth, I show that risk revisions spill to no-damage neighbors and
cause population there to decline as well.
To understand the mechanism behind revisions of risk expectations, I focus on the real
estate market. Higher expected risk can lead to insurance purchases and flood mitigation.
The joint population and housing response helps me answer two questions. First, how im-
portant is local flood mitigation in growing places as a factor behind the sharp population
decline? Insuring higher-value structures is expensive9 and incentivizes owners to improve
flood-resistance. This is reflected in the adjustment of prices and inversely affects popula-
tion. Second, are uninsured losses ignored in low-growth places, given the lack of population
impact? Compensating price declines can explain why population is constant even as expec-
9Standard flood insurance has an upper coverage limit of $250,000. Additional coverage can be purchased
at a higher cost.
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tation are revised.
I show evidence that uninsured losses in growing places lead to housing improvements.10
Prices remain constant and in half of the US regions they increase even with population
declines. The implied improvement is confirmed by the increase in remodeling businesses.
Their number is above what is predicted by damages, and has a positive trend break after
flooding. Improvements reduce insurance cost and maintain value, but they also require
big expenditures from household’s wealth or government loans, which can increase cost of
living in the community and make new construction expensive. I find that improvements
are limited in low-growth places and prices decline significantly. Low housing demand and
stable supply allow small population changes to result in big price adjustments, leaving the
community size unchanged.11 The drop in high-tier, quality-adjusted house prices suggests
that high-income individuals leave.12 There is evidence that unoccupied houses are used,
instead of flood mitigation, to lower expected risk. The identified responses assume that
households can leave. Residents in low-growth areas may experience a lock-in if house values
cannot cover the down payment and transactions costs of an outside house, as in Stein
(1995). I find evidence of this is some communities within the country.
Population declines in locations with bigger low-risk flood zones. This provides evidence
that revisions can occur where historic loss is higher if there are areas with low-risk expo-
sure in the proximity. Both population and real estate prices decline, suggesting a limited
improvement in the housing stock and a real estate market that does not fully compensate
for higher risk. These communities lose low-income individuals since low-tier housing falls
more. Interestingly, places with a bigger flood zone but with no direct impact experience
similar effects, emphasizing the role of expectations of future loss.
I extend the baseline result of the paper in several ways. I evaluate the importance
10This effect is also confirmed by McCoy and Zhao (2018) in the case of Hurricane Sandy for New York
City.
11This is a classic result first discussed by Glaeser and Gyourko (2005).
12Real estate values a provided by Zillow. They are quality adjusted, which allows me to interpret the
price changes as resulting from shifts in demand rather than due to differential flood damage.
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of local social capital, measured by the number of social organizations and churches, and
find that it minimizes the negative impact on population. I add controls for local land
regulation and income and show that higher values of each exacerbate declines in population.
I provide disaggregated, regional evidence about the main population and real estate results
and confirm that flood surprises have a similar effect across the country.
The evidence is important in evaluating the effect of climate change. I show that places
with low past exposure to flooding or those with higher footprint in low-risk flood zones can
experience significant population and real estate changes even with minimal actual flood loss.
Increased flood-risk expectations will make high-population growth places less dependent on
insurance, more expensive, and relatively smaller. Higher value of real estate generates local
tax revenues that can be used to further mitigate risk. Locations with lower population
growth may be less able to deal with future damages since they experience reduced house
values, which lowers local tax revenue and prevention budget, and attract lower-income
households. These places will depend more on insurance given the limited house improve-
ments. Places with high historic losses or frequency of flooding do not experience high
uninsured losses and maintain stable expectations. Losses are reimbursed through insur-
ances with population and house values unaffected. Areas with bigger low-risk flood zones
are an intermediate case. Higher risk makes them smaller but also less expensive.
The evidence shows that places with less than the state-median house units lost to flood-
ing from 1978 to 2003 anticipate close to 20% less damages, when comparing two communi-
ties with the same damages but different past loss-exposure. They have 7% more uninsured
damages as a fraction of their real estate value, compared to high-historic-loss places. Com-
munities with 10% higher share of housing in the 500-year floodplain receive 6% less insurance
payments, when comparing to communities with the same flood damage.
Population declines where historic loss is low or 500-year flood zone is bigger. The long-
term effect is consistent with the interpretation that expected risk has increased. Controlling
for a fixed effect and linear trend, population in the year of the surprise declines by 0.3%,
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remains 0.5%/0.2% below pre-flood level/trend.13 Allowing for relative damage, flood-zone
size, government relief, and factors which can temporarily confound the population effects,
the impact increases: 0.9% initial drop and 0.8%/0.4% below the pre-flood level/trend. The
trend decline lowers population by 2%/4.1% in 5/10 years. 10% higher 500-year zone housing
decreases population by 0.4% and keeps it 0.8% below the pre-flood level. The effects remain
if I proxy for anticipation using 0.1% lost structures or with insurance coverage; the results
are also robust to lowering the cutoff definition on floods to 0.0075% of house value.
The decline is only significant in growing places: population drops 1.1% on impact,
remains 0.8%/0.55% below the pre-flood average/trend, reducing growth by a third. These
locations reach their pre-flood size in two years but population grows slower. Locations with
10% higher low-risk flood zone experience house price declines of 1.6%-2%. The impact
of higher risk in the non-growing communities is concentrated in the residential market:
housing values drop by close to 5%. The high/mid-tier, quality-adjusted house prices decline
by 2.6% suggesting that higher-income individuals leave. There is no change in residential
values in high pre-growth place and the number of remodeling businesses increase by 3.7%
and continue to increase by 3.6% annually.
In Section 2, I discuss related literature and contributions. Section 3 details the compi-
lation of the data. Section 4 presents the empirical features of flooding. Section 5 includes
main results. Section 6 and 7 examine flood spillovers, and extensions/robustness.
2 Related Literature
This paper extends the literature on expectation formation and learning after rare events. I
build on Gallagher (2014), which shows that flood insurance demand increases after flooding
and reverts to past levels over time, arguing that a learning model with newly arriving
residents, not familiar with past flooding, can explain the transient nature of insurance
13The main results are based on low-damage events since each specification controls for relative damage,
centered at 0.1%. The 95th/97th/98th percentiles are 1%, 1.9%, and 2.9% of house value.
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purchases. My paper takes as given that experience with flooding raises risk expectations
and flood insurance demand. Instead of focusing on purchase of new flood insurance, I
examine if increased expectations are strong enough to affect the size of the community and
real estate values over time.14 I extend Gallagher (2014) by showing that the level of existing
risk expectations varies with the amount of historical losses. I show that risk revisions affect
population and real estate values in communities with lower historic flood loss and lower
risk expectations. I further differ from Gallagher (2014) by using a more comprehensive
measure of flood loss which includes insured and uninsured damage. This is key as it allows
me to focus on a subset of communities with non-repetitive, low-scale flood loss (see Kousky
and Michel-Kerjan (2017)), which is likely unexpected by a portion of residents.15 Historical
experience with flood loss is also highlighted by Lindell and Hwang (2008); Peacock et al.
(2005); Shaw and Baker (2010). Recent work by Kousky (2017) emphasizes that insurance
is compulsory for recipients of government relief and can explain some of the increases in
coverage after events. My evidence suggests that both insurance coverage and historical
damage can proxy for the existing level of risk expectations.
Since a big portion of the flood instances in my paper are related to coastal storms and
hurricanes, the results are also related to the literature on natural disasters and their effect
on population and housing. A portion of evidence on population comes from hurricanes with
extensive damage, not restricted to flooding. Strobl (2011) studies coastal counties during
hurricanes during 1970-2005 and finds evidence of only compositional population changes,
suggesting that high-wealth individuals leave affected areas. Boustan et al. (2012) estimate
the odds ratio of living in or moving to areas which experience different types of natural
disasters in the 1920s and 1930s, finding that floods do not dissuade newcomers or current
14Note that the size of the community and the number of insurance policies can evolve in opposite ways.
Gallagher (2014) compares insurance purchases for growing and contracting communities and finds no dif-
ference.
15Note that Gallagher (2014) covers the 1990-2007 period, while I study 2003 to 2013. Gallagher (2014)
identifies flooding using public-property loss and I use total insured and uninsured loss, counting as flooding
cases with more than 0.01% real estate loss.
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residents.16 Boustan et al. (2017) study different types of natural disasters, 70% of which
are floods and tornadoes, between 1920 and 2010, defining a disaster as having at least 25
fatalities. This paper finds a positive effect of floods on the migration rate (negative after
1980) and suggests that new public infrastructure is a key factor. Deryugina (2017) studies
hurricanes between 1979 and 2010 and finds that population is not affected. Compared to
my paper, each of these studies focuses on large-scale events with significant damage. The
response of population captures the combined effect of changes in supply of employment,
housing, public wealth transfers, among others. My paper differ substantially because I
examine a set of communities with minimal damage, where changes in expectations play
a significantly bigger role. I add to the existing results in this literature by showing that
natural disasters affect population in communities far outside the path of destruction. I also
show that the pre-existing risk expectations play a critical role for how population responds
to losses. The existing literature does not separately identify the role of expectations.
In the case of real estate, Bin and Polasky (2004) and Hallstrom and Smith (2005) find
that hurricanes generally reduce real estate prices in the flood plane; Murphy and Strobl
(2010) find that coastal cities see increases in house values after hurricanes. Bakkensen and
Barrage (2017) emphasize that heterogeneity in flood risk expectations of homeowners can
limit house price responses to increased flood risk. Bosker et al. (2018) use parcel-level house
price data for the Netherlands and find that flood-risk reduces house prices.17 My paper
differs from this literature by explicitly considering the impact of pre-existing flood-risk
expectations as well as the role of population change following risk revisions. Furthermore,
I restrict my results to cases with relatively low damages, suggesting that results are mostly
driven by changes in expectations, as in Bernstein et al. (2019) and Atreya and Ferreira
(2015). Contrary to the literature, which on average finds that prices decline after floods, I
show that housing values can increase. I find that this is related to the pre-existing population
16The authors interpret this effect as an outcome to public effort to mitigate against flooding.
17Gibson et al. (2017) use disaggregated housing data for New York City and find that signals of higher
flood risk reduce house prices. Indaco et al. (2019) also uses parcel-level data and finds that inclusion in the
floodplain reduces house prices.
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growth and investments in flood mitigation. House investments which mitigate flooding are
discussed in McCoy and Zhao (2018). I also show that house prices can decline in cases
where housing is widely available but flood risk increases.
Finally, the paper is also related to studies, reviewed by Rosenthal and Ross (2015), which
examine the effect of environmental risk on population and housing. A select set includes
Davis (2004), Banzhaf and Walsh (2008), and Kahn (2000). The former finds compensat-
ing declines in real estate values, while the latter two find a negative association between
population and health risk. Albouy et al. (2016) studies the preference for climate and how
climate change will affect welfare across the US. Relative to this literature, I emphasize that
current economic conditions, e.g. current population growth, can affect how revisions of risk
will impact the housing market and the size of the community. I further show that new-
comers choose to go to communities that do not experience increased flood risk and that
local residents invest in flood mitigation. Both represent adaptations to higher expected risk,
which are key in projecting the impact of climate change, as in Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg
(2015).18
3 Dataset and Institutional Details
Flood Insurance: Flood insurance in the US is administered by the federal government
through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The program makes insurance avail-
able to communities – cities, towns, townships, counties – with flood-zone designations and
enforcement. The map delineates Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA) with varying degrees
of flood risk. The 100-year and 500-year flood zones represent two general categories of
flood risk in the SFHA. Flood is expected to occur in each with certainty every 100/500
years respectively. Importantly, the risk within the 500-year and 100-year SFHA is not uni-
form – local geographic characteristics will make some areas more likely to flood. Insurance
purchase is mandatory for mortgaged structures within the 100-year zone but not required
18For an example of adaptation to flooding in big cities, see Kocornik-Mina et al. (2015).
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otherwise.19 Premiums of flood insurance vary depending on the designation of the flood
zone and the elevation of the structure. The yearly premium for a structure within the
100-year zone is about $6,000 to $10,000 depending on the extent of direct water exposure
and deductible. Total amount of coverage is set at $250,000 for the structure and $100,000
for belongings. In order to get additional coverage, homeowners will need to buy additional
insurance, which is generally more expensive.
Data Sources: The amount of insured damage comes from reimbursements data by
the NFIP for incorporated area. FEMA, the administrator of flood insurance, provides on
its website a running total of payments to each community and total destroyed structures
since 1978. I use archived views of this list in order to get a snapshot of total payments
and their change at regular periods within each year between 2003 and 2013. The change
in payments represents total disbursements to cover insured loss each year. I use the list
of disaster declarations provided by FEMA in order to identify counties which experience
uninsured flood losses in a given year and associate to them insurance payments for that
year. The insured damage is matched to the set of disaster declarations in a given year in
a given county which, in turn, are associated to uninsured damages.20 The data includes
limited information on the number of policies and total coverage for a subset of years. I
take advantage of this data when comparing historical losses to insurance purchase. Note
that while disaster declarations represent cases with bigger damages, these are not uniform
across locations and the main results focus only of low-damage events.
The uninsured loss information comes from the FEMA/Small Business Administration
(SBA) information. FEMA and SBA are the two agencies in charge of relief for households
who experience uninsured damage within disaster declaration communities. FEMA admin-
isters non-refundable aid, while SBA provides low-interest loans. In each case, inspectors
will survey the affected households and will record total damages at the premise. I use this
estimate to quantify total uninsured damages, as opposed to total loans or relief payments
19Kousky (2018) provides an in-depth discussion of the NFIP.
2075% of community/year cases feature total losses based on insured and uninsured damage.
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which have a cap by law. FEMA also administers relief funds for local public infrastructure.
I include the estimated damages on public property.
The sample covers the 38 US states which include flood-related disaster declarations. Ta-
ble 1 lists the states and the number of communities which are affected. Data is aggregated
at the census-designated place level (communities for short), which includes 4,147 distinct
location with median size of 34 thousand people. Total damage comprises four components:
insured individual/business from NFIP; uninsured individual from FEMA and SBA; unin-
sured business from SBA; uninsured public from FEMA. I use the components to control for
events where most of the damage comes from one of the source. Appendix A1 has additional
information.
Population information comes from the annual US Census estimates for cities and towns.
The geographical detail of this data maps directly into the census-designated place level of
the flood damage data. I combine locations with less than fifteen thousand people with
the county unincorporated areas to make sure that results are not driven by very small
settlements. Real estate information comes from Zillow and is available at the zip-code level.
It provides quality-adjusted estimates of house values separated into three tiers. These are
calculated by splitting the price distribution of all housing into three parts and reporting
the middle point of each. Following Banzhaf and Walsh (2008), I convert the zip-code
information to the level of the community by using census-block-based population weight for
each zip code. Similarly, I convert flood-zone maps into census blocks by overlaying the two
using GIS. The rest of the information used in this paper comes from the 2000 US Census
data at the block-group level. I also use the County Business Patterns for establishment
data and the USPS dataset for mail service.
Definition of Floods and Flood Surprises: I identify floods according to the relative
size of the damages: cases where more than 0.01% of the total local real estate value is
destroyed constitute a flood. The relative damage distribution in the sample is very asym-
metric: the 95th/97th/98th percentiles are 1%, 1.9%, and 2.9% of house value. I use 0.01% as
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a cutoff since it is the median for events with at least $10,000 in absolute flood loss. There
are two reasons to set a relatively low cutoff. First, I focus on a wide spectrum of events
because relative damage is context specific – less destructive floods can impact perceived risk
if they are surprises. Second, insured households will likely be reimbursed for losses, while
the uninsured will not always borrow from the SBA or contact FEMA to cover some of the
losses. As a result, uninsured damages may be underestimated. I set a low cutoff in order
to avoid excluding communities which experience a flood but have low coverage since these
are more likely to revise risk expectations.
There are two ways to proxy for risk expectations: with insurance purchases or with
historical losses. I verify that results are consistent when using both. Each measure has
drawbacks. Insurance purchase is required in the 100-year zone or if a household has received
government aid. As a result, households can be required to have insurance despite their low
expectations. While the enforcement of this requirement is not uniform, it is more likely
to indicate that expectations are high in locations with recent floods where government aid
is conditional of insurance purchase. On the other hand, historical losses will not account
for any changes in the local protection infrastructure which can minimize future risk. Since
historical losses are more likely to cause insurance purchases directly, or indirectly through
changes in the flood zones, I identify surprises using previous damage and flood zones.
I measure of historic damage with the total structures completely destroyed due to flood-
ing between 1978 and 2003, provided in the FEMA data of insurance payments.21 I further
normalize it by the total building structures in 2000 and compare to the state median across
all location that experience a flood. Communities below the median are considered low-risk
and assumed to experience flood surprises. Using the median ensures that the distinction
between high and low surprise is region specific and that there are sufficient number of places
which can be placed within each category. In the robustness section, I assume that high sur-
prise are only communities with less than 0.1% lost structures or where the active policies
21Note that I also have information on total dollar amounts paid since 1978 but this is not ideal since,
without proper historical discounting, this cannot be compared across locations.
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are less than 25% of the number based on the population located in the 100-year zone.
4 Empirical Regularities of Flooding in the US
One of the goals of this paper is to describe the US experience with flooding, caused by
both hurricanes/coastal storms and rain/snowmelt in landlocked areas, in the decade after
2003 with a carefully compiled and consistent measure of total damage based on insured and
uninsured damage for each incorporated area. To my knowledge, this is the first nation-wide
characterization of insured and uninsured flood loss, as the literature either works with high-
quality, disaggregated information for small-area studies or uses proxies for damage, such as
disaster declarations, in large-scale ones. Total damage is scaled by real estate value to allow
comparisons across locations. I define a flood as an instance where more than 0.01% of the
local real estate value is destroyed. This number is arguably arbitrary and represents the
median value for all events with more than $10,000 of absolute damage. Using a higher cutoff
will exclude many smaller events and focus on bigger floods. A smaller cutoff can lead to
identification based on local factors not related to flooding. The data includes hurricanes and
wide-scale flooding since both generate significant damage by flooding. While the empirical
regularities here are based on 0.01% cutoff, I show that the main results in the paper hold
with a 0.0075% cutoff.22
There are several important features that emerge when comparing the national flood
experience during the ten years after 2003. These are based on the summary statistics in
Table 1 and Table 2 and Figures 1 through 3.23
First, I document that there is a substantial variation in the extensive margin at the
national level and across states. A substantial number of communities lose at least 0.01% of
real estate value more than once in the sample. Figure 1 shows that flooding is widespread
220.0075% is the median relative damage for events with more than $1,000 of aboslute damage.
23Note that communities that are flooded twice in two years are considered single-flood. This choice is
guided by the event-study empirical model in the paper and the consideration that two consecutive hurricanes
are very unusual.
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across the country and that communities with multiple floods are not located only at the
coast.24 In the interior, major floods result from significant rain or snowmelt which causes
rivers and creeks to spill in the surrounding areas. Table 1 shows that out of the total 4,147
communities in the data, 36%/13%/7.6% experience one/two/three-plus floods during the
sample decade. Flooding is a frequent concern nationwide, not just a problem associated
with infrequent hurricanes. The frequent-flooded locations are not clustered, they are in 17
of the 38 states. The list of states and number of communities in each can be found in Table
2 in the Online Appendix. While most of these states have ocean exposure, several land-
locked states contain frequently flooding communities. Seven states contain only single-flood
locations.
Second, I find that locations that lose at least 0.01% of real estate value more frequently
during the sample on average tend to experience more destructive events. In other words,
the extensive margin is positively related to the intensive margin and is associated with
other community differences consistent with higher expected risk.25 This is contrary to
the intuition that locations which deal with flooding events more frequently can protect
against bigger damages. In Table 1, relative damage increases when comparing communities
with one/two/three and more floods along each of the reported percentiles. Differences in
the 95th percentile are particularly pronounced: 1% for single flood to 1.6% for two floods
and 8.7% for four floods. Relative damage differences are also evident when using absolute
damages as in the second panel of Table 1. In the first panel of Table 2, we also see that
historical losses and insurance increase with the frequency, showing that location differences
are persistent and are reflected in current expectations. House price differences exist mostly
when comparing locations with and without floods, with the latter being more expensive.
Third, I show that one-flood locations tend to share a border with communities that
flood more frequently: 66% are next to at least one multiple-flood place. This can be seen
24Gallagher (2014) already shows that flooding is widespread, using just presidential declarations. I provide
evidence that many communities flood several times in the sample. This is highlighted by Kocornik-Mina
et al. (2015) for cities in general.
25This is confirmed by Kousky and Michel-Kerjan (2017).
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in Figure 1. Of those, 64% have low historical loss, suggesting that more significant events
from outside can generate flood surprises. Single-flood places are also close to areas with one
flood but with high historical loss (above median housing units destroyed by flooding as a
fraction of total local units), which can be another source of surprise flooding. High-historic-
loss communities are shown in Figure 1 as “low surprise.” They tend to be contiguous
to multiple-flood areas, which reinforces the assumption that the former are at a generally
higher risk of flooding.
Fourth, there is a significant difference in flood insurance coverage among locations with
one 0.01% real estate flood loss during the sample period based on their historical loss
experience, i.e. the number of housing units lost to flooding since 1978. The second panel of
Table 2 divides single-flood communities relative to the state median of housing units lost to
flooding (as a fraction of total local units): HistLoss− includes communities with less than
the state median, while HistLoss+ includes those above. The panel shows that communities
with below median losses in the state distribution have 14 insurance policies per thousand
people as opposed to 53 for the rest. After a flood, the former reimburse 18.8% of damages
as opposed to 27.8%. High-historic-loss communities have a higher fraction of population
in flood zones. This suggests that historical loss can lead to changes in local zoning which
can lead to higher insurance purchases. 2.7% of low-loss communities live in a 500-year zone
where insurance purchase is not mandatory. This part of the location is more likely to revise
expectations after a flood.
Fifth, I find that population growth is higher in communities with higher exposure to
water as long as expected risk, proxied by historical loss experience, is lower. Figure 2
provides scatter-bin plots of a subset of the dataset in the paper. The first panel of Figure 2
shows that higher fraction of housing in the 100 and 500-year flood plane is associated with
higher population growth for the community between 2000 and 2005. The second panel of
Figure 2 shows that this is driven by places with lower historical loss (the HistLoss− group
described above). The regression coefficients from the second panel imply that a10% increase
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in flood-plane housing is related to 2.5% higher growth. Table 2 shows that population
increases in locations that appear safer from a historical-loss perspective and where housing
provides significant water-based amenities. This is further confirmed by the difference in
relative house values. Figure 3 presents visual evidence for the Top-tier Housing and shows
that housing is more expensive when its close to water and where historical losses are low.
This suggests that population is guided both by the relative flood risk captured by historic
exposure and by the local amenities.
5 Main Results
The main results examine the role of new risk information from underinsured events in
the location choice of locals and newcomers. I show that past damage and low-risk flood
zones are useful as a proxy for flooding with higher fraction of uninsured damages and lower
expected flood risk. I interpret these events as flood surprises that increase expected risk,
examine their effect on the average community, and characterize the role of existing growth.
I explore the underlying mechanism with evidence from the housing market.
Historical Exposure, Flood Zones, and Insurance in the Cross-section
Homeowners have discretion about whether to buy insurance or, if purchase is required, what
deductible to set. Lindell and Hwang (2008) show this decision is related to expectations,
suggesting that low reimbursements indicate low expectations. Places with low past losses
and low-risk flood zones have limited flood experience and can exhibit low expectations.26
I examine the extent to which they can explain instances with lower reimbursements, after
controlling for damage, by comparing insurance payouts by historical loss and flood zones in
26Lindell and Hwang (2008) show that previous experience increases flood risk perception, while Peacock
et al. (2005) report that proximity is important. Shaw and Baker (2010) show that the effect of past
experience can change over time.
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the cross-section of all events, i.e. using only instances of floods:





ψsSh500Y earZonei + αsDamageiSh500Y earZonei + σsXi + ζs¯Zi + γs×t + ǫi
(1)
Yi is log of flood insurance reimbursement, share of insured damages, or policies per capita
in community i with a flood. 1(1Floodi) and HistLoss
+
i are indicators for single-flood
community and above-median historical loss. Damagei is log of total damage per capita, or
relative damage in the case when regressed on share of insured damages. Sh500Y earZonei
is the share of housing in the 500-year flood zone. Coefficients vary by flood frequency
with s indexing single-flood locations. Xi includes interactions of flood indicators with the
fraction of housing in the 100-year flood zone and the shares of different types of damage.27
Zi includes flood indicators and damage controls for multiple-flood places. Finally, γs×t is a
state-year fixed effect which ensures that identified coefficients are based on within state-year
differences.
Anticipated damages result in reimbursements which track observed loss. I examine
whether the deviations between the two can be explained by historic flood experience or
low-risk flood zones. A positive δs implies that a high-historic-loss location anticipates a
bigger proportion of damages for any level of losses. A positive ηs indicates that for places
with high-historic loss the higher the damage the higher the insurance payments. A negative
ψs suggests that bigger low-risk zones have low risk expectations, insure less, and have lower
reimbursements for the same level of damage. A negative αs suggests that with higher-
damage events, communities with bigger 500-year flood zones receive less insurance. It is
important to control for high-risk (100-year) flood zones because historic damages can update
zoning and require insurance purchase from more residents, explaining why past losses lead to
higher coverage. This implies that the effect of high historic loss identifies risk expectations
27FEMA and SBA damage control for incidence on low-income/higher-income households. Uninsured
damage not covered as a loan by SBA is provided as a non-refundable relief by FEMA.
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distinct from flood zoning.
Table 3 shows estimates from model (1). The results suggest that less flood insurance
is purchased in low-historic-loss places. In column (1), we see that increases in damage per
person are associated with higher flood insurance payouts. Despite this, historic experience
still plays a role in explaining insurance payments: the average high-historic-loss location
has 79% higher payouts compared to low-historic-loss places, at any level of current damage.
This can be driven by high-historic-loss communities being affected by bigger, more damaging
storms. Column (2) allows the effect of historic experience to vary with actual flood damages,
which can test whether historic experience matters at low and at higher damage levels.
The results show that low-historic-loss places anticipate close to 20% less damages, when
comparing two communities with the same damages but different past experience. The higher
uninsured losses are indicative of lower expectations and can lead to significant revisions of
risk.28 In column (3), we see that low-historic-loss places have 7% more uninsured damages
as a fraction of their real estate value, compared to high-historic-loss places. This insurance
difference does not appear to vary with the size of the relative damage, as seen in column
(4), which interacts historic damage with current relative damage. The effect of the share
of housing in the 500-year zone is significant in column (2), but not in column (1). In the
former, we see that comparing two communities with the same damage, the place with 10%
higher share of 500-year housing receives 6% less insurance payments. In column (4), the
500-year share is only significant when interacted with relative damage, suggesting that in
this model the effect of each cannot be identified separately. The results for the 500-year
share provide a somewhat mixed support for identifying areas where uninsured losses from
low-impact events can lead to revisions of expected risk.
Columns (5)-(6) provide estimates using limited data on insurance purchase before a
flood. The number of policies is available only for 2005, 2006, and 2010 floods. This is suffi-
cient to estimate differences in policies only for single-flood places. The evidence, both with
28I also verify that the main results are preserved when using insurance coverage instead of historic loss.
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and without damage interactions shows that the high-historic-loss places have significantly
more flood insurance policies per person compared the low-historic-loss places. Places with
past losses have almost three times the number of insurance policies per person. The effect
of the share of 500-year flood zone housing is also positive and significant, implying a sizable
difference in flood insurance policies with bigger flood zones. While the results are based
on a much smaller dataset, they are consistent with the reimbursement evidence and show
that low-historic-loss places and those with bigger 500-year flood zones are more likely to be
subject to unanticipated, low-impact floods. The effect of flood zones implies that residents
take the zoning information into account. Higher flood zones are related to more policies.
Reimbursements in the 500-year zone are relatively lower, at least in column (2), because
higher purchases do no imply that everyone at risk buys insurance.
Overall, the results confirm that differences in historical flood experience and 500-year
flood zones explain how damages are anticipated. Both independently are associated with
lower insurance for a given level of damage. They identify instances where expectations are
low and the experience or proximity to flooding can lead to revisions. As a robustness check,
I also identify unanticipated floods using relative insurance coverage as a robustness check.
Population Response to Flood Surprises
Here, I quantify the extent to which flood events provide new information which not only
leads to revisions of risk expectations but also is sufficient to affect the location choice of local
population and potential newcomers. I account for invariant differences in location averages
and linear trends, as well as differential responses conditional on local characteristics:
lnPopist = βs1(t = Floodi)+σs1(t > F loodi)+φst1(t > F loodi)+δsXit+ζZit+αi+ψit+γs×t+ǫist
(2)
Log population for place i within state s in year t is explained by a location average, αi, linear
trend, ψi, and a state-year effect, γs×t. The specification allows for time-invariant differences
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in location size and growth, and identifies the effect of floods by common deviation from
each community’s average and trend.29 βs is the effect within the flood year; σs captures the
persistence; φs allows for a pre-flood trend break. Xit includes interactions of 1(t = Floodi),
1(t > F loodi), and t1(t > F loodi) with relative damage, centered at 0.1%, the fraction of
housing in the 500-year flood zone, and the fraction of FEMA damages. The first interaction
implies that βs, σs, and φs are population effects for locations with low-impact flooding.
The second interaction is of particular interest since it captures the effect of underinsured
losses due to low-risk flood zones. The third interaction controls for areas where more
of the affected are low-income households. I explore this effect further in the extensions
section. I also include interactions with the the share of construction employment, renters
(each centered at their median) and insured/business damages.30 Zit includes indicators
for periods and trends before/during/after for multiple-flood places. Finally, the state-year
effect captures state-driven variations in local population.
The Census-based construction and renters shares are time-invariant and only allow to
identify if locations with more construction workers and renters respond differently. This
is critical since single-flood places border multiple-flood ones and serve as a destination for
the displaced and temporary workers. Low construction share implies a higher availability
of job opportunities outside construction which draws in displaced population; a high share
leads to an outflow of construction workers who help repairs affected areas. The renter share
controls for the capacity to accommodate the displaced and emergency/temporary workers.
The specification can account for factors that are commonly viewed as endogenous with
respect to the size of flooding. For example, it is possible that an unobservable factor causes
communities to invest less in flood protection and ultimately leads to bigger damages. As
long as this factor is internalized by the local population and the potential new-comers, it
will be reflected in the population trajectory before and after the flood, and will be accounted
29Size/trend differences are discussed in Desmet and Henderson (2014) and Desmet and Rappaport (2017).
30In the extensions, I include interactions with the level of income, land regulation, local social organization,
among others.
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for by ψi. If the factor is internalized after the flood, it is captured by the Xit interactions.
I extend the baseline model by allowing βs, γs, and φs to differ by historic loss:
lnPopist = HistLoss
−(βLs 1(t = Floodi) + σ
L
s 1(t > F loodi) + φ
L
s t1(t > F loodi))+
HistLoss+(βHs 1(t = Floodi) + σ
H
s 1(t > F loodi) + φ
H
s t1(t > F loodi))+
δsXit + ζZit + αi + ψit+ γs×t + ǫist
(3)
This model distinguishes between the effect of unanticipated and anticipated floods. I use
three different measures to proxy for surprise floods. In the baseline results, I use the number
of fully destroyed houses during 1978-2003 relative to each town’s total housing units. I then
calculate to the state median and assign communities to the HistLoss− (low historic loss)
category if they are below the median or to HistLoss+ (high historic loss) if they are above.
I also use 0.1% of local structures destroyed, which applies the same cutoff for the entire
country. Lastly, I compare the insurance policies per capita to the fraction of population
within the 100-year flood zone. Surprises are assumed to occur in places with active policies
less than 25% of the fraction in the 100-year zone.
Finally, I allow coefficients to differ by historical losses and previous population growth:
lnPopist = HistLoss
−HistGr−(βLLs 1(t = Floodi) + σ
LL
s 1(t > F loodi) + φ
LL
s t1(t > F loodi))+
HistLoss−HistGr+(βLHs 1(t = Floodi) + σ
LH
s 1(t > F loodi) + φ
LH
s t1(t > F loodi))+
δsXit + ζZit + αi + ψit+ γs×t + ǫist
(4)
HistGr− is an indicator for communities which did not experience population growth in the
period prior to the flood. HistGr+ indicates communities with positive growth. Growing
locations attract more new-comers and experience demand for new housing because of im-
proved labor market or/and local amenities. Conditioning on pre-growth can reveal how
persistent demand for housing and more expensive real estate can affect the overall response
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to a flood surprise. It also helps us interpret the trend break by identifying whether growing
or stagnant locations see a change in trajectory.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 report estimates from model (2) with/without con-
trols. Population in the average single-flood place drops by 0.4%-0.56% after the year of the
flood. The contemporaneous effect is only significant with controls.31 10% higher fraction
of housing in the 500-year zone leads to 0.3% lower population on impact and 0.78% lower
population in the period after the flood. Higher relative damage leads to lower population
decline since more damaging events are more anticipated. Columns (3) and (4) show results
from model (3). Population declines are significant only in communities with lower risk ex-
pectations/higher uninsured damages. Column (4) shows that population drops by 0.93%
on impact and remains 0.79%/0.37% blow its pre-flood level/trend. The effect of 10% higher
500-year zone implies that population drops by 0.39% on impact and remains 0.83% blow its
pre-flood level. The negative effect on population is lower than that from low-historic-loss
since expectations in the flood zone are likely higher. Each of the effects is estimated at low
relative damages which strongly suggests that these are driven by revisions of expected risk
not supply/wealth effects. Locations where expected risk is higher are not affected.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 measure unanticipated floods based on 0.1% historically-
destroyed structures and 25% insurance coverage. In the both cases the results are very
similar. This is due to the tight link between historical experience and insurance coverage
discussed above. Since historical losses lead to higher coverage, one can use either to identify
unanticipated floods. It is possible that the observed interaction between pre-flood growth
and flood surprises is due to differences in income or local land-use regulation, not in the
growth per se. I explore these alternatives in the robustness section. The evidence suggests
that they are not able to explain why population decreases after a risk revision. Finally,
column (7) reports results when floods are defined as losses over 0.0075% of house value.
These are very close to the baseline case in column (4). The estimated coefficients are slightly
31The effect of construction employment is negative, while renter share is positive.
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lower, reflecting the inclusion of communities with lower impact.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 report estimates based on model (4). Declines in pop-
ulation occur only in attractive communities with positive pre-flood growth. Population
drops by 0.55%/1.1% without/with controls and remains 0.54%/0.82% lower in the post
period. The pre-trend declines by 0.41%/0.55%. These communities experience a drop in
population and a slowdown in growth after the flood surprise. Since the average growth in
low-loss/high-growth communities is 1.5%, the increase in expected risk reduces growth by
a third. The estimates suggest that these locations reach their pre-flood size in two years
but continue to growth slower. Using alternative measures of flood surprises does not change
the main conclusion: columns (3) and (4) show that only growing communities experience
population declines. The insurance-based measure implies somewhat lower responses while
the 0.1% cutoff shows higher declines in population.
The short-term declines are much smaller than the impact over the five or ten years
following the flood. In attractive locations the medium-term impact is between three and
five-times bigger. The relative magnitude supports the interpretation of the flood generating
uninsured losses which change risk expectations. A purely supply-driven shock with no
change in risk will have the opposite relative magnitude with bigger effect on impact.
The unanticipated floods in attractive communities slow down the pre-flood growth but
they continue to expand afterwards. This raises the question of whether local housing com-
pensates for the increased risk or there are additional improvements in local infrastructure
which mitigate risk. Similarly, the lack of change in the population of low-growth com-
munities is consistent both with surprises having no risk information or with significant
compensation in residential prices. The next section investigates how developments in the
real estate market help explain the effect of flood surprises.
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Real Estate Responses
The population evidence leaves several unanswered questions related to the mechanism
through which growing communities slow down. In principle, the decrease in demand for
housing can reduce prices and lead to a relatively small population effect. Alternatively,
homeowners can improve housing structures and increase residential prices for existing and
new construction, further reducing population. The real estate market can shed light on the
relative size of the population adjustment based on the size of response of housing. It also
allows us to distinguish whether low-growth communities ignore the information from floods
or adjust primarily through price changes.
The main results are based on estimating model (4) using house price information from
Zillow for three separate tiers. Coefficient estimates are listed in Table 6. There is no
evidence that house values, across all three tiers, compensate for the increase in flood risk
at growing locations. This is the case for the baseline measure of unanticipated floods
in columns (1)-(3) as well as with the two alternative ones in (4) and (5). The decrease
in population and constant residential prices are consistent with subsequent investments
in local housing which offset the increase in expected risk and make existing housing and
new construction more expensive. I provide evidence for this by examining how businesses
engaged in house remodeling (NAICS 236118) change after an unanticipated flood, using
information from the County Business Patterns data. The results in column (6) show that
high-growth communities see a substantial increase in the number of remodeling businesses.
There are 3.7% more establishments during the year of the flood and they continue to
increase over time as implied by the 3.6% increase in the post-trend. Note that higher
relative damages increases the number of these businesses as communities rebuild. In the
case of growing communities, this rebuilding is not due to higher overall damage but due
to uninsured losses which lead to revisions of future risk. I further experimented with other
construction industries and did not find any significant changes.
The evidence implies that unanticipated floods increase expected risk and incentivize
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home owners to lower future exposure to damages. Owners save on insurance cost and do
not have to provide a compensating discount in the case of future sale. The higher value
of housing in growing places can additionally motivates investments as in Gyourko and Saiz
(2004). This suggests that in high-growth communities owners effectively experience a one-
time wealth loss which preserves the value of their real estate. As a result, existing real estate
and new construction are more expensive relative to the existing flood risk which reduces
population growth in the community. Capozza and Helsley (1990) suggest that uncertainty
due to expected flood risk can delay new construction and increase prices of existing housing.
In the case of low-growth locations, the evidence shows a clear decline of house values
after risk revisions. Top and middle-tier housing decrease by 2.7%/2.5% on impact; the dip
is persistent and remains 3.7%/4.2% lower in the post period. Bottom-tier housing does
not appear to decrease on impact although it declines by 5.3% in the post period. The
change in house prices implies that flood surprises provide new risk information in low-
growth communities despite the lack of population adjustment. Price adjustments dominate
quantity ones because these locations have a bigger stock of available houses due to the lack of
pre-existing growth. I provide evidence of this by examining how the stock of houses without
mail service changes, based on the USPS dataset which tracks whether an address can receive
mail. Evidence in column (7) shows the fraction is higher before the surprise, declines by
0.91% during the impact year, and remains 0.69% lower. Higher damages and more housing
in the 500-year zone are associated with a higher number of unoccupied housing. This results
for low-growth places show households can move within rather than invest in improving the
existing structures. Absent additional home improvements, residential prices will decline.
In these communities, the decrease in residential prices is sufficient to offset the increased
risk. In fact, there is a notable increase in population growth as seen in Table 5 which can
be linked to the decrease in house prices. This result is similar to Glaeser and Gyourko
(2005), and more recently to Notowidigdo (2011), who point out that negative productivity
shocks will not lead to population declines but to reduction in local house prices. The fact
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that more expensive houses take the brunt of the adjustment indicate that the higher-wealth
population likely leaves the community. This is consistent with findings by Boustan et al.
(2017) and Strobl (2011) who show that high-income individuals leave after disasters.
Locations with a higher fraction of 500-year flood zone housing experience decreases in
house prices. 10% higher fraction leads to 1.6% decline in top/middle-tier prices and 2.1% in
the bottom tier. There is evidence that the growth of house prices decreases between 0.18%
and 0.38% after the flood. The relatively higher drop in bottom-tier housing suggests that
lower-income households leave. The fact that both population and house prices decline, sug-
gest that there are some limited house improvements, which are not sufficient to completely
offset the depreciation of house prices.
All together, the housing and population results suggest that flooding in places with
previous experience does not affect the community because expectations remain stable and
damages are insured. In contrast, uninsured, low-level losses cause revisions of flood ex-
pectations, which can either lead to the purchase of flood insurance or investment in home
improvements. In attractive communities the stock of housing is limited and existing struc-
tures are more valuable. This incentivizes homeowners to invest in remodeling to offset
increasing risk and maintain real estate values. While residential prices are not affected,
the effective cost of living increases resulting in a lower future growth. In less attractive
communities, the existing stock of unoccupied housing prevents homeowners from investing
in improvements of structures. Instead, they can limit risk exposure by moving within the
community. As a result of this population remains constant but residential prices adjust
in order to compensate for the increased risk. Low-risk flood zones are an intermediate
case with limited house improvement which is not sufficient to offset the decline in housing.
Changes in prices do not completely compensate for higher risk and population declines.
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6 Flood Spillovers
Expectations of flood risk can be affected in places without direct damage. Lindell and Perry
(2000) summarizes evidence of the effect of mass media on personal mitigation behavior.
Gallagher (2014) shows that insurance purchases pick up after floods at locations within the
same media market. This suggests that flood experience elsewhere can help update local
risk expectations. I explore this with a simple extension of the baseline model which allows
spillovers in two different set of locations: places in counties without direct effect and those,
in affected counties, without direct damage. More specifically, I estimate:
Yist = INoFCnty(β1It=F1 + β2It=F2 + β3It=F3) + IFCnty/NDam(β¯sIt=F1 + σ¯sIt>F1 + φ¯stIt>F1)
+IFCnty/Y Dam(βsIt=F1 + σsIt>F1 + φstIt>F1) + δsXit + ζZit + αi + ψit+ γs×t + ǫist
(5)
where Yist is either log of population or log of residential prices. INoFCnty refers to the set of
locations in counties with no direct impact. β1, β3, and β3 quantify the effect of being next
to a single or multiple-flood county at the time of the event. IFCnty/NoDam refers to the set
of locations within directly-affected counties which do not experience direct losses. In this
case, I can examine the effect of being a neighbor to a single-flood community and break
this down into a contemporaneous effect, β¯s, a post- effect, σ¯s, and a trend break, φ¯s. The
rest of the model follows the baseline specification.
The evidence, reported in Table 7, confirms that floods can affect places away from the
epicenter of damages. In the case of population, column (1) shows that locations outside of
flood counties experience effects depending on the frequency of flooding in the neighboring
areas. Since higher flood frequency is related to higher average damages, the effect on
neighboring counties has a non-linear damage-related impact on local population. For smaller
levels of damage population is not affected or can increase. New population avoids places
with moderate damage and moves to neighboring counties, which are viewed as a safer
alternative. Neighbors to high-frequency flooders are negatively affected, implying that
with bigger damages, even neighbors are avoided. Results from columns (2)-(4) show that
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residential prices are positively related to the identified changes in population. This implies
that there are minimal changes in house supply, real estate does not fully compensate for
proximity to risk, and shifts in demand primarily explain changes in population and prices.
Locations sharing a county with single-flood communities but are not directly impacted
are also affected. Population decreases on impact by 1.4%, remains 1.6% lower in the post
period, and the pre-trend declines by 0.32%. The evidence is consistent with the interpre-
tation of unanticipated floods which provide new information about future risk. There are
two reasons why the impact can be bigger than for those directly affected. First, business
damages can reduce employment for commuting workers from nearby, unaffected locations.
Second, the level of expected risk can be even lower in places without a flood, leading to
a higher risk revision. Mid/low-tier housing prices decrease on impact by 1.6%/1.1% and
remain 1.5%1.8% lower. High-tier housing prices are not affected. This implies that higher
income households likely invest in improving their structures and offset the increased risk
expectations. Mid-income households do not invest and likely leave, leading to composi-
tional changes. This is also consistent with mid/low income individuals being more likely to
commute and be affected by business damages nearby. The effect of low-risk flood zones is
similar in the case of areas within affected counties but with no direct damage. Population
declines by 0.3% and remains 0.8% below average for places with 10% higher 500-year flood
zone share. House prices decline by 1.5%-2%, with the bigger decline for the low-tier housing.
Finally, we see that the estimates for directly affected communities are very similar
to the main results in Table 4. Taking all of the spillover evidence together shows that
a wide range of areas will be affected by flooding. More importantly, some community
experience population and residential-price impacts without a direct exposure to damage.
This highlights the importance of disaggregated, detailed loss information as well as the
significance of revision of risk expectations. The latter can operate at a longer distance and
impact communities far from the focus of the damage.
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7 Extensions and Robustness
Regional Results: The main results are based on a national sample which combines lo-
cations across various geographies each with a specific climate and regulatory setting. I
examine changes in population and residential prices and interpret their joint dynamic to
explain how weather surprises can reshape communities and their neighbors. In this part, I
confirm that changes in quantities occur where prices do not adjust and vice versa by focus-
ing on regions within the US. This ensures that the main results are not driven by outcomes
in a particular state or region.
The regional results for population and house prices are listed in Table 8. The baseline
population results are highly representative of different areas of the country. The population
evidence shows that low-growth areas experience limited changes in all but two regions:
the Northeast and the West. Population drops in all high-growth communities. In the
West region, high-growth places experience much higher decrease in population, which is
consistent with the relatively higher price compensation in low-growth places. In Northeast,
the contemporaneous effects are similar for high- and low-growth locations but the persistent
decline is slightly bigger for the high-growth ones. This is also consistent with the higher
decline in residential prices in the low-growth communities. The results confirm that surprises
affect population at high pre-growth communities.
Regional real estate results for all tiers are reported in Table 8. Prices in high-growth
locations either remain constant or in some cases increase after unanticipated floods. The
Northeast is the only exception to this since prices decline in high-growth places. Yet, they
still decline less in relative terms. Prices in low-growth communities provide a compensating
decline in all areas but the Midwest and the South Central. The difference in insurance
reimbursement in these two regions suggested that low-historical-loss locations are more
likely to experience unanticipated floods. The results here suggest that communities in these
areas may ignore information from weather surprises as important for flood risk revision.
Relative Damage by Historic Loss: The results in this paper control for relative
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damage at the average location and do not allow the effect to differ by the extent of historic
losses. Here, I relax this assumption. The results are shown in column(1) of Table 9. Higher
relative damage reduces the overall negative effect of unanticipated flood on population.
The evidence confirms that the main results in the paper are not driven by negative supply
shocks. Lower-damage locations are more likely to experience population declines that are
driven by changes in risk expectations. The insurance evidence showed that anticipation
is much lower for low-damage events. Locations which experience higher damage are more
likely to anticipate the event. These communities are distinct from the rest of the low-
historical-loss places and are not affected by a flood surprise as much.
Local Social Organizations and Churches: The literature on resilience after natural
disasters identifies the importance of local social capital Aldrich (2012). The literature on
deeper roots of productivity across the US also emphasizes endowments of social capital
Fulford et al. (2018). To accommodate this, I use information from the County Business
Patterns dataset which lists the total number of establishments at a zip code by 6-digit
industry code. I calculate the total number of civic and social organizations (NAICS 813410)
and religious organizations (NAICS 813110) per capita in each community and interact this
number with the set of impact indicators as described above. The results for population are
listed in column (2) of Table 9. The evidence shows that higher social capital weakens the
decline in population both on impact and in the post period. These results are consistent
with the literature on social capital which suggests that communities with higher endowment
will do better after disasters.
Land-use Regulation and Income: The paper emphasizes the importance of pre-flood
positive net migration and its interaction with flood surprises. Here I also explore whether the
local housing supply elasticity or the local income level can explain the observed population
patterns. For house elasticity, I use the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index
(WRLURI) from Gyourko et al. (2008). I am able to match a third of the baseline sample
with the WRLURI and this limited sample. I interact the index with the set of controls for
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the impact indicators. For the case of local income, I use the 2000 Census and interact level
of income, centered at the median value of 40 thousand. Results are listed in Table 9.
Column (3) shows that land regulation does not explain the population declines. Regu-
lation has a similar negative impact on communities that anticipate and do not anticipate
floods. This suggests that communities with higher regulation are more likely to invest in
improving the housing stock after a flood surprise. As a result there will be a stronger
population decline as living in these locations becomes relatively more expensive given the
increase in expected risk. Column (4) reports the evidence using local income as a control.
Communities with higher income experience stronger population contraction. The interpre-
tation of this result is similar to the effect of stronger regulation. Higher local income allows
more local homeowners to improve the housing stock. This leads to higher cost of living
and reduces population as a result. In each case the additional controls do not change the
main results, confirming that these are driven by changes in risk expectations which are only
partially related to the robustness controls in this section.
Low-wealth Incidence: The identified responses to risk revisions in the main results
rest on the assumption that households are not prevented from leaving. This is critical in
the case of homeowners who may experience a lock-in effect if the value of their current
house cannot cover the down payment and transactions cost of the house they would like
to move into, as in Stein (1995). The lack of population responses in communities where
expected risk increases can be due to the inability households to finance their way out. This
can explain why some regions within the country seem to ignore flood surprises.
I examine the extent to which low wealth can explain the lack of population changes
in low growth areas by using the FEMA relief payments data. Guidelines from the agency
imply that lower income applicants for disaster relief will be given non-refundable payments
as opposed to loans. I test whether flood incidence among low-wealth households is higher in
low growth or low-historic-loss communities by examining total FEMA payments per damage
recorded and how they differ in low-growth communities. I also do this for SBA loans.
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Results, in columns (1) and (2) of Table 10, show that low-growth communities receive
more FEMA relief, holding total and FEMA damage constant. Separating effects by regions
we see that low-growth communities in the South Central area on average receive 15% more
relief for the same level of damage and FEMA damages, compered to the rest. This explains
the limited quantity and price effect in this region. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 10 show
that low-historic-loss/low-growth communities in the Northeast region are more likely to
finance losses through government loans. Since loans are used to improve housing, this is an
indication that these places invest in risk-mitigation even in the low-growth category.
8 Conclusion
This study provides a description of the US flooding experience in the decade after 2003
with a carefully compiled data on insured and uninsured damage for each incorporated area.
Flooding is a frequent and widespread concern nationwide. I show that when evaluating the
impact of disasters, expectation revisions can be critical. Low historical flood experience and
low-risk flood zones can identify instances where the share of uninsured losses is high and
expected flood risk is low. Experience with or proximity to flooding due to these weather
shocks can lead to risk revisions and can highlight the importance of risk in the location and
risk-mitigation decision. I find that flooding leads to a sizable population decline primarily
in areas with lower risk expectations. This is explained by growing communities where the
higher value of real estate leads to investments in flood mitigations, keeping prices from
falling and increasing the cost of new construction. These places grow slower and become
more expensive to live in, suggesting that the flood-insurance-cost incentives, combined with
increased risk expectations and high real estate value, make the community better prepared
to absorb future losses. Less attractive places do not see population changes and higher
risk leads to insurance compensating price declines. The lower house values, the decrease in
the number of higher-income individuals, and the limited house investments suggests that
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weather shocks make these places less able to absorb future losses. This implies that global
warming will generate divergence in loss exposure and reliance on government relief across
communities based on they existing growth conditions.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Relative and Absolute Damage for Communities with Different Flood Frequencies
Relative Damage Distribution Total Damage ($1 mil) Distribution
Obs p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
Communities with No Flooding 1,771 - - - - - - - - - -
Communities with One Flood 1,519 0.02% 0.05% 0.14% 0.46% 1.03% 0.64 1.67 5.02 16.14 42.39
Communities with Two Floods 542 0.02% 0.06% 0.19% 0.69% 1.55% 0.64 1.80 5.70 20.75 47.18
Communities with Three Floods 238 0.02% 0.07% 0.25% 0.86% 1.72% 0.79 2.45 9.14 33.90 76.74
Communities with More than Three Floods 77 0.02% 0.09% 0.34% 1.27% 8.66% 0.83 3.42 13.50 69.68 213.80
The table lists the total number of communities and select percentiles for the distribution of relative/absolute damage for communities
which experience one/two/three/more than three floods during the sample years of 2003-2013. A flood is an event with more than 0.01%
total loss as a fraction of the community’s real estate value. Two consecutive floods are are placed within the “one-flood” category.
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Historic Flood Loss and Historic Population Growth
Communities with X Floods HistLoss− HistLoss− HistLoss+ HistLoss+
X=0 X=1 X=2 X>2 HistLoss− HistLoss+ HistGr− HistGr+ HistGr− HistGr+ HistGr− HistGr+
Count 1,771 1,519 542 315 934 585 400 1,119 229 705 171 414
Relative Damage 0 0.0027 0.0053 0.033 0.0022 0.0035 0.0027 0.0027 0.0016 0.0023 0.004 0.0033
(0) (0.0082) (0.0174) (0.168) (0.0055) (0.0112) (0.0072) (0.0085) (0.0047) (0.0058) (0.0093) (0.012)
Total $ Damage (1M) 0 12.94 13.53 163.8 7.918 20.90 9.108 14.37 3.573 9.313 15.80 23.28
(0) (50.20) (42.45) (1220.2) (27.12) (72.52) (37.69) (54.11) (13.09) (30.16) (53.55) (79.87)
Structures Lost (1978/2000) 0.0032 0.0079 0.019 0.039 0.0021 0.017 0.0097 0.0073 0.0023 0.0021 0.018 0.016
(0.010) (0.017) (0.040) (0.063) (0.002) (0.025) (0.021) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.028) (0.023)
Insurance Policies Per Cap 2.077 29.26 27.65 48.18 14.32 52.96 16.08 34.19 3.216 17.88 31.65 62.92
(16.28) (71.20) (70.48) (84.45) (39.69) (98.56) (57.09) (75.26) (3.992) (45.00) (82.35) (104.0)
Total % RE Coverage 0.00345 0.0406 0.0573 0.0782 0.0194 0.0741 0.0240 0.0468 0.00680 0.0235 0.0447 0.0879
(0.0229) (0.0944) (0.126) (0.123) (0.0458) (0.134) (0.0851) (0.0970) (0.0164) (0.0512) (0.122) (0.137)
Fraction in 100 year zone 0.0085 0.0591 0.0617 0.0986 0.0461 0.0798 0.0335 0.0687 0.0165 0.0555 0.0539 0.0919
(0.042) (0.144) (0.112) (0.145) (0.132) (0.158) (0.110) (0.153) (0.0688) (0.146) (0.143) (0.164)
Fraction in 500 year zone 0.0173 0.0432 0.0321 0.0364 0.0269 0.0691 0.00979 0.0557 0.00630 0.0335 0.0140 0.0949
(0.0982) (0.136) (0.0897) (0.0837) (0.0992) (0.177) (0.0299) (0.157) (0.0272) (0.112) (0.0326) (0.209)
Share of Insured Damages 0 0.223 0.261 0.384 0.188 0.278 0.194 0.233 0.144 0.202 0.256 0.288
(0) (0.292) (0.318) (0.349) (0.281) (0.301) (0.281) (0.296) (0.239) (0.292) (0.316) (0.295)
Share of Uninsured FEMA 0 0.228 0.217 0.166 0.241 0.207 0.270 0.212 0.286 0.227 0.251 0.186
(0) (0.188) (0.193) (0.162) (0.187) (0.188) (0.215) (0.174) (0.211) (0.176) (0.219) (0.169)
Share of Uninsured Business 0 0.122 0.107 0.0861 0.122 0.121 0.111 0.126 0.112 0.125 0.109 0.127
(0) (0.166) (0.158) (0.137) (0.167) (0.164) (0.158) (0.168) (0.151) (0.172) (0.168) (0.162)
Share of Uninsured Home 0 0.285 0.316 0.239 0.306 0.252 0.283 0.285 0.301 0.307 0.262 0.247
(0) (0.199) (0.221) (0.200) (0.206) (0.184) (0.201) (0.198) (0.211) (0.204) (0.188) (0.182)
Population (100k) 0.636 0.651 0.799 0.671 0.595 0.740 0.524 0.699 0.551 0.609 0.490 0.857
(1.382) (0.929) (1.789) (0.964) (0.901) (0.966) (0.772) (0.977) (0.925) (0.894) (0.536) (1.093)
Median Income (100k) 0.468 0.439 0.427 0.425 0.434 0.447 0.367 0.466 0.360 0.458 0.376 0.480
(0.253) (0.194) (0.161) (0.220) (0.184) (0.209) (0.157) (0.200) (0.138) (0.191) (0.177) (0.214)
Population Growth 0.0074 0.0088 0.0086 0.00009 0.010 0.005 -0.003 0.013 -0.003 0.015 -0.004 0.010
(0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.091) (0.017) (0.014) (0.007) (0.016) (0.007) (0.017) (0.008) (0.014)
Top Tier House Value 0.296 0.260 0.224 0.249 0.240 0.292 0.159 0.298 0.136 0.273 0.186 0.342
(0.319) (0.231) (0.188) (0.215) (0.202) (0.267) (0.262) (0.206) (0.213) (0.187) (0.311) (0.229)
Middle Tier House Value 0.200 0.175 0.144 0.163 0.162 0.196 0.107 0.201 0.0910 0.185 0.126 0.229
(0.214) (0.153) (0.127) (0.133) (0.136) (0.174) (0.167) (0.139) (0.128) (0.131) (0.205) (0.148)
Bottom Tier House Value 0.136 0.117 0.0962 0.107 0.108 0.132 0.0741 0.133 0.0632 0.122 0.0873 0.152
(0.154) (0.115) (0.0974) (0.101) (0.100) (0.134) (0.124) (0.107) (0.0874) (0.0997) (0.157) (0.117)
Table lists averages and standard deviation for groups of communities defined in four distinct ways. The first panel shows statistics by communities with no/one/two/two
plus floods in the sample. The second panel divides the communities which experience one flood (or two consecutive) relative to the state median of historic flood loss.
HistLoss−/HistLoss+ includes communities below/above the median. Historic flood loss is defined as the total structures lost to flooding in the community relative to the
number of current structures. The third panel divides the communities which experience one flood depending on their historical population growth. HistGr−/HistGr+
includes communities with non-positive/positive population growth in the three years prior to their flooding. The final panel interacts the historic loss and population
growth categories.
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Table 3: Historic Loss, Flood Zones, and Flood Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Flood Insurance Share Flood Log Flood Insurance
VARIABLES Payouts Per Person Insured Damages Policies Per Person
1(1Flood) -0.183 0.0263 0.0224 0.0225 -0.812** -0.883**
(0.176) (0.205) (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.293) (0.321)
1(1Flood)×Damage 0.798*** 0.738*** 0.436 0.576 0.0415 0.0621
(0.0743) (0.0941) (1.023) (0.716) (0.0449) (0.0644)
1(1Flood)×HistLoss+ 0.793*** 0.116 0.0639*** 0.0645*** 1.561*** 1.735***
(0.119) (0.232) (0.0166) (0.0174) (0.108) (0.314)
1(1Flood)×HistLoss+ ×Damage 0.169** -0.753 -0.0414
(0.0664) (1.149) (0.0641)
1(1Flood)× Share 500-year Zone -0.103 2.721*** 0.0395 -0.0108 2.461*** 2.839***
(0.500) (0.617) (0.0315) (0.0256) (0.389) (0.646)
1(1Flood)× Share 500-year Zone×Damage -0.614*** 14.18*** -0.0718
(0.170) (4.345) (0.159)
Observations 3,439 3,439 3,562 3,562 1,473 1,473
R-squared 0.603 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.570 0.570
State-Year FE X X X X X X
Additional Controls X X X X X X
Sample All Floods All Floods All Floods All Floods 2005/2006/2010 2005/2006/2010
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table includes results from estimating a cross-sectional model of all flood events in the
sample. Columns (5) and (6) use a subset of the sample when insurance policy information is available (years 2005, 2006m and 2010).
Floods are defined as instances with more than 0.01% of damage as a fraction of local real estate. 1(1Flood) is an indicator for the
occurrence of one (or two consecutive) flood during the sample. Damage is total damage per capita in (1)-(2), (5)-(6) and damage as
a fraction of local real estate value in (3)-(4). Share 500-year Zone is the share of housing in the 500-year flood zone. HistLoss+ is an
indicator for above-median historical loss. Additional controls estimated but not reported are: share of housing in the 100-year zones, the
share of damage affecting households which receive FEMA non-refundable relief, the share of damages affecting households which receive
SBA loans, the share of damages affecting businesses which receive SBA business loans. I also include but do not report a set of indicators
and damage controls for communities which are affected by more than one flood. Sample covers the period between 2000 and 2016. SE
clustered by state.
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Table 4: Floods, Historical Loss, and Population Changes
Log Populationit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Historical Loss: State Median 0.1% Lost 25% Insurance Floods: 0.0075%
Lost Structures Structures Coverage Relative Damage
1(1Flood)1(t = Flood) -0.000832 -0.00566**
(0.00112) (0.00260)
1(1Flood)1(t > F lood) -0.00396*** -0.00564**
(0.00144) (0.00262)













1(1Flood)1(t = Flood) -0.00307** -0.00928*** -0.0113*** -0.00807** -0.00803**
(0.00120) (0.00347) (0.00389) (0.00339) (0.00321)
1(1Flood)1(t > F lood) -0.00463*** -0.00794** -0.00895** -0.00838** -0.00648**
(0.00174) (0.00341) (0.00415) (0.00352) (0.00323)
1(1Flood)1(t > F lood)t -0.00146** -0.00365*** -0.00454*** -0.00259*** -0.00326***













1(1Flood)1(t = Flood) 0.00293 -0.000500 -0.00383* -0.00445* -0.000528
(0.00193) (0.00175) (0.00230) (0.00236) (0.00172)
1(1Flood)1(t > F lood) -0.00261 -0.00218 -0.00460* -0.00422* -0.00222
(0.00218) (0.00214) (0.00241) (0.00250) (0.00213)
1(1Flood)1(t > F lood)t 0.00215*** -2.95e-05 -0.00132* -0.00190** 9.32e-05
(0.000615) (0.000738) (0.000716) (0.000754) (0.000754)










1(1Flood)1(t = Flood) 0.0592 -0.0349 0.0214 0.0663 -0.0769
(0.0682) (0.0732) (0.0686) (0.0689) (0.0854)
1(1Flood)1(t > F lood) 0.00976 -0.0660 -0.0149 0.0179 -0.116
(0.117) (0.119) (0.119) (0.118) (0.126)
1(1Flood)1(t > F lood)t 0.0862*** 0.0515 0.0692** 0.0886*** 0.0375











1(1Flood)1(t = Flood) -0.0323* -0.0391** -0.0348** -0.0308* -0.0365**
(0.0171) (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0166) (0.0180)
1(1Flood)1(t > F lood) -0.0780*** -0.0832*** -0.0795*** -0.0761*** -0.0801***
(0.0244) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0238) (0.0253)
1(1Flood)1(t > F lood)t 0.0105 0.00776 0.00941 0.0109* 0.00749








1(1Flood)1(t = Flood) 0.0216 0.0244 0.0234 0.0216 0.0173
(0.0146) (0.0150) (0.0148) (0.0145) (0.0143)
1(1Flood)1(t > F lood) 0.0161 0.0178 0.0169 0.0161 0.00956
(0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0134)
1(1Flood)1(t > F lood)t 0.00398 0.00511** 0.00485* 0.00402 0.00283
(0.00263) (0.00259) (0.00257) (0.00262) (0.00276)
Observations 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403
Within R-squared 0.00500 0.0248 0.00786 0.0280 0.0269 0.0251 0.0268
Town FE X X X X X X X
State x Year FE X X X X X X X
Town Linear Trend X X X X X X X
Additional Controls X X X X X
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.1(t = Flood) is an indicator for flood event. 1(t > F lood) is an indicator for the period following
the first year of impact. t × 1(t > F lood) is a linear trend starting the in the period following the impact. Low/High Historical Loss
is an indicator based on the state median lost structures between 1978 and 2003. Relative Damage is total damage as a share of real
estate value. Sh500-yearFloodZone is the share of housing in the 500-year flood zone. Fema Damage is fraction of damages covered by
government relief. The additional controls for Share Construction/Share Renters are included where indicated in the table. All results
include but do not report coefficients for multiple-flood communities. Estimation (5) and (6) use a different definitions for low historical
loss and high surprise – less than 0.1% destroyed structures; less than 25% of population in the 100-year zone has insurance. Sample:
2000/2016. SE clustered by community. Estimation (7) uses a different definition for floods – events with relative damage above 0.00075%
(the median relative damage for cases with over $1,000 of absolute damage).
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Table 5: Population: Flood Surprises, Historical Growth
Log Populationit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Historical Loss: State Median 0.1% Lost 25% Insurance





















1(t = Flood) -0.00550*** -0.0107*** -0.0125*** -0.00866***
(0.00142) (0.00328) (0.00389) (0.00321)
1(t > F lood) -0.00538*** -0.00823** -0.00794* -0.00692**
(0.00207) (0.00333) (0.00436) (0.00349)
t1(t > F lood) -0.00409*** -0.00545*** -0.00644*** -0.00430***









1(t = Flood) 0.00657*** -0.00128 -0.00222 -0.000201
(0.00115) (0.00399) (0.00388) (0.00480)
1(t > F lood) 0.000965 -0.00369 -0.00605 -0.00734
(0.00189) (0.00392) (0.00428) (0.00459)
t1(t > F lood) 0.00681*** 0.00449*** 0.00418*** 0.00659***
(0.000601) (0.000889) (0.00103) (0.00103)










1(t = Flood) -0.0705 -0.0153 0.0212
(0.0711) (0.0616) (0.0604)
1(t > F lood) -0.125 -0.0768 -0.0472
(0.107) (0.104) (0.104)












1(t = Flood) -0.0353** -0.0311* -0.0281*
(0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0168)
1(t > F lood) -0.0826*** -0.0784*** -0.0761***
(0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0241)







1(t = Flood) 0.0230 0.0220 0.0203
(0.0146) (0.0142) (0.0141)
1(t > F lood) 0.0178 0.0166 0.0162
(0.0134) (0.0131) (0.0130)
t1(t > F lood) 0.00297 0.00287 0.00202
(0.00246) (0.00241) (0.00247)
Observations 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403
Within R-squared 0.0269 0.0439 0.0432 0.0419
Town FE X X X X
State x Year FE X X X X
Town Linear Trend X X X X
Additional Controls X X X
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.1(t = Flood) is an indicator for flood
event. 1(t > F lood) is an indicator for the period following the first year of impact.
t × 1(t > F lood) is a linear trend starting the in the period following the impact.
Low/High Historical Loss is an indicator based on the state median lost structures be-
tween 1978 and 2003. Low/High Pre Growth refers to non-positive population growth
before the flood/positive growth before the flood. Relative Damage is total damage as a
share of real estate value. Sh500-yearFloodZone is the share of housing in the 500-year
flood zone. Fema Damage is fraction of damages covered by government relief. The
additional controls for Share Construction/Share Renters are included where indicated
in the table. All results include but do not report coefficients for multiple-flood com-
munities. Estimation (3) and (4) use a different definitions for low historical loss and
high surprise – less than 0.1% destroyed structures; less than 25% of population in the
100-year zone has insurance. Sample: 2000/2016. SE clustered by community. The
estimation results do not report the coefficients for multiple-flood communities.
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Table 6: Real Estate Values: Flood Surprises, Historic Growth
Top Tier Middle Tier Low Tier Top Tier Top Tier Remod No Mail
Housing Housing Housing Housing Housing Establish Service
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Historical Loss: State Median 0.1% Lost 25% Insur State State





















1(t = Flood) 0.00176 0.00359 0.00856 -0.00425 -0.00249 0.0373* -0.00109
(0.00588) (0.00627) (0.00755) (0.00795) (0.00641) (0.0220) (0.00255)
1(t > F lood) 0.000276 0.00483 0.00116 0.00540 -0.00176 0.00679 -0.000448
(0.00780) (0.00781) (0.00943) (0.0104) (0.00781) (0.0270) (0.00278)
t1(t > F lood) -0.000168 -0.00139 -0.00132 0.00156 0.00316 0.0358*** 0.000180









1(t = Flood) -0.0268** -0.0249** -0.0235* -0.0424*** -0.0524*** -0.0118 -0.00907**
(0.0107) (0.0119) (0.0136) (0.0152) (0.0125) (0.0322) (0.00394)
1(t > F lood) -0.0374*** -0.0415*** -0.0531*** -0.0445** -0.0605*** -0.00806 -0.00689*
(0.0132) (0.0156) (0.0178) (0.0182) (0.0156) (0.0399) (0.00397)
t1(t > F lood) 0.00510 0.00403 0.00713* -9.57e-05 0.00261 -0.00221 0.000158
(0.00313) (0.00359) (0.00418) (0.00447) (0.00431) (0.0151) (0.00120)










1(t = Flood) 0.163 -0.119 -0.382 0.176 0.210 2.914** 0.0947
(0.294) (0.321) (0.347) (0.290) (0.280) (1.139) (0.112)
1(t > F lood) -0.292 -0.651 -1.043** -0.239 -0.251 4.349*** 0.441***
(0.369) (0.419) (0.432) (0.361) (0.359) (1.399) (0.123)
t1(t > F lood) -0.0275 -0.0605 -0.111 -0.0269 -0.0346 -0.0804 -0.00533











1(t = Flood) -0.0353 -0.00276 0.0102 -0.0356 -0.0317 0.0758 -3.33e-05
(0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0419) (0.0286) (0.0287) (0.134) (0.0117)
1(t > F lood) -0.162*** -0.167*** -0.209*** -0.159*** -0.159*** 0.0636 -0.00353
(0.0463) (0.0476) (0.0633) (0.0453) (0.0453) (0.166) (0.00782)
t1(t > F lood) -0.0179** -0.0220** -0.0379*** -0.0178** -0.0171** 0.0521 0.0181***






1(t = Flood) -0.00970 -0.0134 -0.0135 -0.00908 -0.0110 -0.0353 -0.00174
(0.0199) (0.0197) (0.0243) (0.0202) (0.0194) (0.0709) (0.00729)
1(t > F lood) -0.00668 -0.0167 -0.0158 -0.0103 -0.00807 0.0302 -0.00590
(0.0278) (0.0253) (0.0295) (0.0284) (0.0271) (0.0880) (0.00820)
t1(t > F lood) -0.00340 0.00293 -0.000339 -0.00391 -0.00296 -0.0505 0.00112
(0.00630) (0.00587) (0.00723) (0.00652) (0.00620) (0.0326) (0.00245)
Observations 61,530 60,920 54,554 61,530 61,530 51,031 38,481
Within R-squared 0.0168 0.0187 0.0179 0.0169 0.0180 0.00421 0.00267
Town FE X X X X X X X
State x Year FE X X X X X X X
Town Linear Trend X X X X X X X
Additional Controls X X X X X X X
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Top/Middle/BottomTier refers to the log of the respective house price Zillow
index. Remodeling Establish refers to the log of establishments engaged in house remodeling (NAICS 236118). No Mail
service refers to the fraction of houses which are designated as No Service in the USPS mailing dataset. 1(t = Flood) is
an indicator for flood event. 1(t > F lood) is an indicator for the period following the first year of impact. t1(t > F lood)
is a linear trend starting the in the period following the impact. Low/High Historical Loss is an indicator based on the
state median lost structures between 1978 and 2003. Low/High Pre Growth refers to non-positive population growth
before the flood/positive growth before the flood. Relative Damage is total damage as a share of real estate value.
Sh500-yearFloodZone is the share of housing in the 500-year flood zone. Fema Damage is fraction of damages covered
by government relief. The estimation results do not report the coefficients for Share Construction/Share Renters and
multiple-flood communities. Estimation (3) and (4) use a different definitions for low historical loss and high surprise –
less than 0.1% destroyed structures; less than 25% of population in the 100-year zone has insurance. Sample: 2000/2016.
SE clustered by community. The estimation results do not report the coefficients for multiple-flood communities.
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Table 7: Flood Spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4)









ty No Direct Damage ×
I(t = NextOneF lood) -0.000538 0.00308 0.00436 0.00787**
(0.000722) (0.00315) (0.00325) (0.00400)
I(t = NextTwoF loods) 0.00338*** 0.00711* 0.0111*** 0.0126***
(0.00113) (0.00372) (0.00398) (0.00460)
I(t = NextThreeF loods) -0.00279** -0.0117*** -0.0189*** -0.0168***








No Direct Damage ×
I(t = NeighborF lood) -0.0140*** -0.0138** -0.0197*** -0.0140**
(0.00308) (0.00607) (0.00609) (0.00698)
I(t > NeighborF lood) -0.0157*** -0.0151** -0.0224*** -0.0252***
(0.00369) (0.00726) (0.00730) (0.00866)
tI(t > NeighborF lood) -0.00331*** 0.00121 -7.34e-05 0.00122









I(t = Flood) -0.00603** 0.000337 0.00174 0.00531
(0.00260) (0.00532) (0.00553) (0.00669)
I(t > F lood) -0.00627** -0.00232 -0.000207 -0.00795
(0.00263) (0.00678) (0.00687) (0.00855)
tI(t > F lood) -0.00203*** 0.000553 -0.00154 -0.000563
(0.000709) (0.00187) (0.00198) (0.00228)
Controls for Flood County / No Direct Damage
Relative Damage ×
I(t = NeighborF lood) 0.0572 0.152 -0.100 -0.405
(0.0688) (0.302) (0.320) (0.344)
I(t > NeighborF lood) 0.00997 -0.257 -0.617 -1.059**
(0.118) (0.359) (0.398) (0.411)
tI(t > NeighborF lood) 0.0845** -0.0336 -0.0646 -0.106
(0.0330) (0.0658) (0.0657) (0.0686)
500-year Flood Zone ×
I(t = NeighborF lood) -0.0314* -0.0262 0.00240 0.0119
(0.0167) (0.0290) (0.0289) (0.0420)
I(t > NeighborF lood) -0.0777*** -0.150*** -0.160*** -0.200***
(0.0239) (0.0457) (0.0476) (0.0639)
tI(t > NeighborF lood) 0.0111* -0.0198*** -0.0236*** -0.0392***
(0.00653) (0.00708) (0.00899) (0.0104)
Fema Dam ×
I(t = NeighborF lood) 0.0210 -0.0179 -0.0218 -0.0207
(0.0146) (0.0198) (0.0195) (0.0242)
I(t > NeighborF lood) 0.0154 -0.0176 -0.0274 -0.0263
(0.0136) (0.0276) (0.0254) (0.0296)
tI(t > NeighborF lood) 0.00377 -0.00161 0.00462 0.00128
(0.00263) (0.00633) (0.00600) (0.00724)
Observations 70,403 61,530 60,920 54,554
Within R-squared 0.0391 0.0228 0.0230 0.0211
Town FE X X X X
State x Year FE X X X X
Town Linear Trend X X X X
Additional Controls X X X X
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. No Flood County refers to places in unaffected
counties. Flood County refers to places in a county with a single-flood community. I(t =
NextOneF lood)/I(t = NextTwoF loods)/I(t = NextThreeF loods) is the effect of being
next to a county with one/two/three-plus floods. I(t = NeighborF lood) indicates the year
of the single flood of the neighbor. I(t > NeighborF lood) indicates the period after the single
flood of the neighbor. tI(t > NeighborF lood) allows for a trend-break after the single flood
of the neighbor. Sample: 2000/2016. SE clustered by community. For more information of
the controls consult Table 5
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Table 8: Regional Responses to Flood Surprises: Population and RE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population Top Tier RE Mid Tier RE Low Tier RE
Low Historical Loss Low Historical Loss Low Historical Loss Low Historical Loss






1(t = Flood) -0.0123*** -0.0151*** -0.0255* -0.0297*** -0.0118 -0.0221** -0.0224 -0.0154
(0.00464) (0.00420) (0.0145) (0.0107) (0.0155) (0.0110) (0.0179) (0.0137)
1(t > F lood) -0.0110** -0.0133*** -0.0470** -0.0418** -0.0513** -0.0388** -0.0515** -0.0259
(0.00545) (0.00502) (0.0197) (0.0167) (0.0231) (0.0170) (0.0250) (0.0188)
t1(t > F lood) -0.00385** -0.00599*** -0.00280 -0.00558 -0.000213 -0.00720 -0.00149 -0.0110*







c 1(t = Flood) -0.00363 -0.0107** -0.0382* -0.0299** -0.0440** -0.0380*** -0.0504*** -0.0372**
(0.00463) (0.00429) (0.0202) (0.0131) (0.0199) (0.0144) (0.0188) (0.0156)
1(t > F lood) -0.00508 -0.00510 -0.100*** -0.0373* -0.119*** -0.0372* -0.138*** -0.0452*
(0.00623) (0.00508) (0.0230) (0.0197) (0.0248) (0.0204) (0.0227) (0.0232)
t1(t > F lood) 0.00442*** -0.00631*** 0.0206*** -0.00520 0.0210*** -0.00726 0.0220*** -0.0105






1(t = Flood) -0.00158 -0.0140*** -0.0338* -0.00114 -0.0220 0.00172 -0.0152 0.0128
(0.00470) (0.00423) (0.0184) (0.00981) (0.0198) (0.0122) (0.0217) (0.0134)
1(t > F lood) -0.00251 -0.0120*** -0.0318 -0.000316 -0.0234 0.00930 0.00119 0.00436
(0.00503) (0.00463) (0.0205) (0.0135) (0.0244) (0.0136) (0.0312) (0.0153)
t1(t > F lood) 0.00381*** -0.00534*** -0.00228 -0.00395 -0.00680 -0.00419 -0.0112* -0.00557









1(t = Flood) 0.00202 -0.00790** -0.0728*** 0.0444*** -0.0284 0.0414*** -0.0610 0.0389**
(0.00570) (0.00372) (0.0241) (0.0103) (0.0211) (0.0114) (0.0418) (0.0155)
1(t > F lood) -0.000796 -0.00281 -0.0498 0.0262* -0.0363 0.0254* -0.0531 0.0280
(0.00712) (0.00521) (0.0368) (0.0143) (0.0492) (0.0150) (0.0486) (0.0196)
t1(t > F lood) 0.00699*** -0.00500*** -0.0163* 0.0105** -0.00573 0.00782* -0.00655 0.00702







al 1(t = Flood) 0.000695 -0.0102** 0.0125 0.0175* -0.0147 0.0208** 0.000400 0.0157
(0.00397) (0.00416) (0.0186) (0.00959) (0.0268) (0.00975) (0.0426) (0.0139)
1(t > F lood) -0.000692 -0.00597 0.0204 0.0205* 0.00301 0.0183 -0.0291 -0.00355
(0.00542) (0.00560) (0.0263) (0.0114) (0.0338) (0.0121) (0.0435) (0.0162)
t1(t > F lood) 0.00411** -0.00599*** 0.00877 0.00109 0.00648 0.00128 0.0180*** 0.00517




1(t = Flood) -0.00293 -0.0151*** -0.150*** 0.0378** -0.277*** 0.0424** -0.378*** 0.0521**
(0.00369) (0.00496) (0.0106) (0.0168) (0.0113) (0.0169) (0.0132) (0.0217)
1(t > F lood) 0.00116 -0.0174*** -0.170*** 0.0595*** -0.285*** 0.0638*** -0.354*** 0.0724***
(0.00459) (0.00657) (0.0123) (0.0213) (0.0138) (0.0226) (0.0163) (0.0259)
t1(t > F lood) 0.00560*** -0.00961*** -0.00499 -0.0125*** 0.00897** -0.0137** 0.00663 -0.0111**
(0.00155) (0.00199) (0.00306) (0.00449) (0.00352) (0.00535) (0.00407) (0.00506)
Observations 69,695 61,454 60,825 54,459
Within R-squared 0.0555 0.0336 0.0348 0.0359
Town FE X X X X
State x Year FE X X X X
Town Linear Trend X X X X
Additional Controls X X X X
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. I(t = Flood) is an indicator for flood event. I(t > F lood) is an indicator for the period following the
first year of impact. tI(t > F lood) is a linear trend starting the in the period following the impact. Low Historical Loss is an indicator based on
the state median lost structures between 1978 and 2003. Low/High Pre Growth refers to non-positive population growth before the flood/positive
growth before the flood. Sample: 2000/2016. SE clustered by community. The estimation results do not report the coefficients for multiple-flood
communities. I have split region 1 into Northeast and Mid-Atlantic and region 3 into South Atlantic and South Central. For more information of
the controls consult Table 3
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Table 9: Robustness: Damage, Social Organizations, Land Regulation, and Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Population
Xi :Relative Xi :Social Xi :Land Xi :Relative












1(t = Flood) -0.00677*** -0.00704*** -0.00987*** -0.00644***
(0.00234) (0.00235) (0.00320) (0.00231)
1(t > F lood) -0.00613*** -0.00538*** -0.00791** -0.00421**
(0.00187) (0.00194) (0.00312) (0.00184)
t1(t > F lood) -0.00262*** -0.00309*** -0.00471*** -0.00256***
(0.000602) (0.000614) (0.00112) (0.000578)
1(t = Flood)×Xi 0.510* 0.00726*** -0.00156 -5.22e-05
(0.302) (0.00223) (0.00203) (5.67e-05)
1(t > F lood)×Xi 0.560** 0.00564* -0.000588 -0.000205**
(0.219) (0.00332) (0.00283) (8.81e-05)
t1(t > F lood)×Xi 0.146 0.00481*** -0.00181** 2.00e-05













1(t = Flood) 0.000250 0.000679 -0.00129 0.000278
(0.00152) (0.00163) (0.00285) (0.00158)
1(t > F lood) -0.00196 -0.00272 -0.00549* -0.00143
(0.00208) (0.00231) (0.00321) (0.00230)
t1(t > F lood) 0.00129** 0.00156** 0.000614 0.00117*
(0.000623) (0.000652) (0.00119) (0.000643)
1(t = Flood)×Xi -0.182*** -0.000798 -0.00308 -5.69e-06
(0.0598) (0.00404) (0.00209) (6.29e-05)
1(t > F lood)×Xi -0.136 0.00174 -0.00803** -0.000121
(0.0889) (0.00426) (0.00315) (0.000110)
t1(t > F lood)×Xi 0.0425 -0.000159 0.000346 3.18e-05
(0.0338) (0.00108) (0.00121) (3.21e-05)
Observations 70,403 70,403 23,747 69,695
Within R-squared 0.0150 0.0155 0.0210 0.0159
Town FE X X X X
State x Year FE X X X X
Town Linear Trend X X X X
Additional Controls X X X X
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Relative Damage refers to total damage at
community i scaled by the value of real estate. Social organizations refers to the total
number of civic and social organizations (NAICS 813410) and religious organizations
(NAICS 813110) per capita. Land regulation refers to the Wharton Residential Land
Use Regulation Index. Relative income refers to the median personal income centered at
$40K. I(t = Flood) is an indicator for flood event. I(t > F lood) is an indicator for the
period following the first year of impact. t× I(t > F lood) is a linear trend starting the in
the period following the impact. Low/High Historical Loss is an indicator based on the
state median lost structures between 1978 and 2003. Sample: 2000/2016. SE clustered
by community.
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Table 10: Low-wealth Incidence of Floods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log FEMA Log SBA
VARIABLES Relief Per Capita Loans Per Capita
I(OneF loodi) -0.182* -0.181* -0.753*** -0.726***
(0.0959) (0.0932) (0.137) (0.141)
I(OneF loodi)× LogDamagei -0.0913*** -0.0874*** 0.00489 0.00307
(0.0284) (0.0280) (0.0314) (0.0319)
I(OneF loodi)× LogFEMADamagei 1.019*** 1.020***
(0.0216) (0.0212)
I(OneF loodi)× LogSBADamagei 0.967*** 0.972***
(0.0273) (0.0290)
I(OneF loodi)× I(LowHistLossi) 0.0129 -0.0617
(0.0361) (0.0432)





























Share 100-year Flood Zone -0.302*** -0.280*** 0.121 0.149
(0.0929) (0.0958) (0.0974) (0.110)
Share 500-year Flood Zone -0.581*** -0.571*** -0.132 -0.152
(0.0817) (0.0790) (0.124) (0.128)
Observations 2,851 2,851 2,879 2,879
R-squared 0.980 0.980 0.963 0.964
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FEMA Relief is the total non-refundable pay-
ments by FEMA to cover losses. SBA Loans is the total amount of loans to cover damage.
I(OneF lood) is an indicator for the occurrence of one flood during the sample. Damage is
total damage per capita. I(LosHistLossi) is an indicator for below-median historical loss.
FEMA Damage refers to total damage per capita reported by FEMA and related to relief
payments. SBA Damage refers to total damage per capita reported by SBA and related to
disaster loans. Additional (non-reported) controls: in (1), (2) Share Sba Dam/Share Bus
Dam; in (1), (2) Share Fema Dam/Share Bus Dam. I have split region 1 into Northeast and
Mid-Atlantic and region 3 into South Atlantic and South Central. Sample covers the period
between 2000 and 2016. SE clustered by state.
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Figure 3: Top Tier House Price and Proximity to Water
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Appendix (for online publication)
Appendix A: Data Construction
NFIP maintains an official record of the number of policies sold, total coverage, and total
payouts at the level of a given community since the program effectively partners with the local
authority enforcing the flood map and building code. The geographical level is consistent
with the US Census definition of general-purpose government units such as cities, towns,
townships, as well as the remaining county areas (county balance). I focus on 38 states with
FEMA disaster declarations related to flooding. Table 2 lists the states considered. Median
population across the 4,147 communities in 38 states in the sample is 34 thousand people.
Insurance information includes homeowners and business structures.
NFIP does not list payouts associated with particular flood events. Instead, it shows
up-to-date payouts starting from 1978. I use historical observations of the official record
taken approximately twice a year between 2003 and 2014 to calculate the amount of new
payouts claimed at each community. These represent insured damages associated with flood
events during each year. I carefully link the observed payouts to the set of FEMA disaster
declarations for each state. The matching was not automated but involved reading the
description of FEMA declarations for each state/year and associating flood events in the
covered counties to observed insurance payouts at communities in those counties. This link
allows me to identify both the amount of insured and uninsured damages for each FEMA
event. In approximately 25% of community/year cases total losses are based only on insured
damage. This is consistent with the fact that not all communities in counties with disaster
declarations will have significant uninsured losses.
The uninsured damages are sourced from FEMA’s individual/public assistance data and
from Small Business Administration’s (SBA) individual/business lending data. A disaster
declaration makes federal funding available to affected individuals without insurance. They
can receive either a direct non-refundable payment or a highly subsidized loan depending
on their ability to take on additional credit. FEMA administers the direct payments and
SBA extends the loans. Both maintain a registry that identifies the amount of assistance
provided and the related total damage at the zip-code level for each disaster declaration.
Altogether, total damage in the data has four components: insured individual/business from
NFIP; uninsured individual from FEMA and SBA; uninsured business from SBA; uninsured
public from FEMA. In this paper I focus primarily on total damage. The components are
only used to control for events where most of the damage comes from one of the source.
Relative damage is calculated using an estimate for the total value of the real estate
during the year of a flood. The value is calculated using information from the 2000 Census
at the block level. I add the total housing values listed in the Census across all of the value
categories for a total real estate value in 2000. I then use the annual state house values from
the FHFA to project the 2000 values forward for each year.
Zip-code data is associated to community-level data using block-level population weights.
In particular each Census block lists the total population, the zip-code, and the community.
This allows me to assign zip-code values to communities by appropriately weighting using
population. Data on flood insurance policies is only available for the years of 2002-2006 and
2010, due to a change in data reporting. Fraction of population in a flood zone has been
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calculated by overlaying community flood zones with census blocks from the 2000 Census. I
use area as weights to assign the 2000 population from each block to flood zones.
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Appendix B: Robustness
Table B1: Communities with Different Flood Frequencies by State
Communities with X Floods
State X=0 X=1 X=2 X>2
Alabama 41 50 5
Arkansas 20 40 17
California 316 45 1
Colorado 38 23
Connecticut 36 33 7 5
Delaware 4 2
Florida 7 99 34 47
Georgia 99 43 12 3
Illinois 74 74 54 27
Indiana 38 88 6 4
Iowa 6 44 29
Kentucky 22 48 31 6
Louisiana 6 6 20 40
Maryland 29 5
Massachusetts 46 67 21 2
Minnesota 90 23 6 2
Mississippi 8 30 26 23
Missouri 38 48 30
Nevada 13 2
New Hampshire 2 24
New Jersey 12 83 14 77
New York 66 74 19 34
North Carolina 82 51 8 2
North Dakota 4 11
Ohio 89 73 34 6
Oklahoma 25 38 15
Oregon 45 10 2
Pennsylvania 39 82 49 31
Rhode Island 2 12 14
South Carolina 51 15
South Dakota 7 7 1
Tennessee 38 75
Texas 170 65 56
Vermont 3 13 2
Virginia 67 28 6 4
Washington 64 26
West Virginia 20 23 5 2
Wisconsin 58 46 7
Total 1771 1519 542 315
The table lists the total number of commu-
nities which experience one/two/three/more
than three floods during the sample years of
2003-2013 for each state. A flood is an event
with more than 0.01% total loss as a fraction
of the community’s real estate value. Two con-
secutive floods are are placed within the “one-
flood” category.
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